Abstract: While politicians wage legislative battles about welfare benefits, bureaucratic procedures represent a less visible means to shape access to those benefits. By constructing complex and time-consuming application procedures, the state can effectively create administrative barriers that limit access to benefits. What explains the variation in the level of administrative burden that individuals face? We address this question by examining Medicaid procedures across the 50 U.S. states, identifying different types of administrative barriers. We find that such barriers tend to be lower in states with unified Democratic control of political institutions.
Introduction
While politicians wage ongoing legislative battles over which social benefits the poor should receive, bureaucratic procedures represent an alternative-and less visible-means of shaping access to those benefits. By constructing complex, confusing, and time-consuming application procedures, the state can effectively thwart an individual from accessing benefits, even if eligible by law. We examine variation in the level of administrative burden that individuals face when they seek to access social benefits, as well as how political factors may shape the level of administrative burden states impose on their citizens. Better understanding this variation has broad relevance to studies of the political economy of poverty and inequality (Jacobs and Soss, 2010) , social policy (Brodkin and Majmundar, 2010) , public administration (Moynihan and Herd, 2010) , and citizen-state interactions (Mettler and Soss, 2004) .
Specifically, this paper documents, compares, and explains variation in formal application requirements (i.e. compliance administrative burden) experienced by individuals accessing a standard federal program across US state governments: Medicaid. Medicaid is a means-tested health insurance program for individuals who meet certain income and asset guidelines. The costs of the program are shared between the state and federal governments, and states have a great deal of autonomy in structuring their Medicaid programs-particularly their administrative procedures. Indeed, we find significant variation in administrative burden across states and that the level of burden differs in states governed by Democrats versus Republicans in the previous decade. This illustrates how political factors may play a role in structuring the administrative burden faced by applicants for Medicaid, as well as how states use administrative burdens as an additional (often overlooked) policy tool, or what Lineberry (1977, 71) refers to as "policymaking by other means."
When Do Burdens Become Red Tape?
In this paper, we conceptualize our dependent variable in terms of administrative burdens placed on citizens. We define administrative burden as an individual's experience of policy implementation as onerous (Burden et al., 2012) . A broad stream of literature focuses on the discretion of street-level government actors in implementing government policies (Lipsky, 1980 (Lipsky, , 1984 and how citizens are classified by various policies (Schneider and Ingram, 1997) , but relatively little research has considered the origins of systematic administrative compliance burdens that citizens face in their interactions with the state.
Perhaps the closest concept to administrative burden, coming from public administration scholarship, is that of red tape. Even in this research area, the definition and study of this concept has been relatively narrow. Red tape is defined by Bozeman (2000, p.12) as "rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a compliance burden, but do not advance the legitimate purposes the rules were intended to serve." This definition suggests that any rule that advances a legitimate purpose cannot be classified as red tape. A recent reevaluation of the definition concluded that "it is difficult to find rules that had absolutely no functionality or no positive outcomes. Rules that provided some functionality but also disproportionate burdens would, in the classic definition, not be considered red tape. For example, many rules that serve their purpose of limiting fraud in the claiming of public benefits also create significant barriers to access among legitimate claimants. When do the negative impacts of such a rule lead it to being classified as red tape?" (Feeney, Moynihan, and Walker, 2010, 4) . Perhaps because of the restrictive nature of the definition, little attention has been paid to the actual rules that citizens face; instead, the extant research has been centered on managerial perceptions of red tape (Bozeman and Feeney, 2011) .
To explain administrative burden, we focus on the political economy of rules affecting actors outside the organization. Theory on red tape emphasizes the potential for rules that once served a purpose to evolve into red tape over time (rule-evolved red tape). This insight is important, because natural bureaucratic processes can potentially allow problematic rules to continue. Bad rules are not necessarily designed to be bad, but simply have become less useful over time. Red tape research, however, has not explored the potential for such rules to be used as a deliberate policy tool or the possibility that they could have partisan origins. Both the ruleevolved and political economy perspectives can help explain why citizens face onerous rules.
But from the citizen's point of view, conceptual debates about the appropriate dividing line between red tape and administrative burden are beside the point. While citizens might recognize and understand the basic need for procedural fairness (Tyler and Lind, 1992) , their perceptions are driven largely by the nature of their experiences with bureaucratic processes, as the next section describes.
How Administrative Burden Matters
The impact of administrative burdens on citizens has been documented in two distinct research areas. Welfare studies show that rules and their implementation significantly affect the ability of eligible claimants to access entitlements. Policy feedback research indicates that citizens who experience negative policy interactions with the state have reduced political efficacy. We examine each in turn.
Several social welfare studies have examined how program structure alters the access citizens have to benefits and the rate of uptake among legitimate claimants. Much of this research depends upon comparisons between means-tested and universal programs, showing that means-tested policies that target poorer populations are more complex, requiring demanding eligibility forms and procedures (Korpi and Palme, 1998) , despite offering fewer benefits.
Empirical research has shown that the compliance burdens associated with means-tested programs have a real impact in limiting access to benefits. While almost all individuals eligible for universal programs (such as Medicare and Social Security) receive benefits, only 40-60 percent of those eligible for means-tested Supplemental Social Insurance and about 25 percent of those who qualify for Medicaid receive benefits (Elder and Powers, 2006; Shore-Sheppard, 2008 ). Just over a third of those eligible for food stamps do not receive them (Food and Nutrition Service, 2007) .
Some percentage of non-participation in such programs may be truly voluntary, but the administrative complexity of means-tested programs has been found to explain a large portion of non-use of benefits (for a review, see Currie, 2004) . For example, Bennett (1995) shows that more than a quarter of welfare case closings (removing the claimant from the public rolls) in her sample were attributable to problems the claimants had with documentation rather than to changes in eligibility. Brodkin and Majmundar (2010) further find that procedural barriers faced by claimants explain a significant amount of the decline in welfare caseloads, and that these barriers systematically affect some groups-poorer and less educated claimants-more than others.
Burdens may not just affect access to benefits, but also the experience that the citizen has of the state and how he or she responds to that experience (Moynihan and Herd, 2010) . Through policy rules, citizens are taught lessons regarding their worth and standing (Schneider and Ingram, 1997) . Studies that examine the policy feedback effect of programs on citizens often compare citizen experiences associated with means-tested versus universal programs, while attempting to deal with selection bias by controlling for citizen characteristics. Such research shows that citizens with experiences related to means-tested programs express a lower sense of political influence (Soss, 1999) , are less likely to engage in a variety of political actions such as voting or campaigning (Verba et al., 1995) , and have lower levels of social trust (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005) . Using a model that controls for the potential selection bias issues that had limited prior analyses, Bruch, Marx-Freere, and Soss (2010) find that citizens who interacted with the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program had lower voting, political participation, civic participation and political engagement relative to those in other means-tested programs. They also determine that these effects were largest in states that were the most paternalistic (in terms of being more active in regulating the behavior of program recipients).
They conclude that "social-welfare program designs can influence levels of civic and political engagement among the poor" (Bruch, Marx-Freere, and Soss, 2010, 219) .
Application Compliance Burden
Administrative burdens come in a variety of forms. For example, it can be difficult to learn about a program, or whether one is eligible. In addition, applying for and receiving benefits can confer a stigma and a psychological burden. But, here, we study application compliance burden, which we define as the costs borne by individuals when completing application and recertification processes, including required documentation and testing, and responding to or avoiding the discretionary demands of program staff. While the empirical aspect of our analysis focuses only on formal documentation and process requirements, we do not mean to imply that bureaucrats are unquestioning implementers. Any understanding of application compliance burden would be incomplete without some consideration of bureaucratic discretion. Lipsky (1984) characterizes efforts to use administrative burden to reduce take-up of welfare benefits as one form of "bureaucratic disentitlement," and he finds that this is more likely to occur when resources are limited (see also Keiser and Soss, 1998) . Such tools have been used in welfare programs as a deliberate means of social control and disciplining of the poor, especially minorities (Soss, Fording, and Schram, 2011) , and a central theme of street-level bureaucracy research is how the characteristics of claimants shape the decisions of bureaucrats. For example, Scott (1997) uses an experimental design to show that the level of organizational control and client characteristics matter to bureaucratic use of discretion in assigning benefits.
In practice, it is difficult to separate the effects of bureaucratic discretion in assigning benefits from the policies and rules they implement. Bureaucrats can alter application compliance burdens through their choices about what information to share with claimants, for example, or by the amount of documentation they demand, or how helpful they are when a claimant is completing forms. Previous studies demonstrate both how much application enrollment burdens limit access and just how important a helpful bureaucratic advocate can be in overcoming these burdens. For example, Schanzenbach (2009) describes an experiment in which a sample of taxpayers was provided assistance in completing Medicaid forms in California. She finds that those who received such assistance were almost 80% more likely to actually apply for benefits than those who were informed they were eligible but given no special assistance. A similar experiment among people applying for federal financial aid for education finds that those given assistance in completing forms were more likely to send in the applications, leading to a 29% increase in actual college enrollment (Bettinger et al., 2012) .
The formal rules that create administrative burden is an understudied topic that falls between two often-studied streams of literature: policy formation and administrative behavior.
For example, we know a good deal about why welfare policies are created to be more or less generous (e.g., Klarner, Mao, and Buchanan, 2007) . The exercise of bureaucratic discretion in policy implementation is also well-documented enough to feature a robust literature on streetlevel bureaucracy (Loyens and Maesschalck, 2010) , as well other approaches to studying bureaucratic discretion. But in between policy formation and implementation, blurring both categories, are the administrative rules and procedures intended to reflect policy, constrain bureaucrats, and shape the experiences of citizens in their encounters with the state. These burdens may be mediated or exacerbated by bureaucratic action and citizen capacities, but they are worth studying because they serve as the framework for bureaucratic action and have demonstrable effects in their own right.
Bureaucratic implementation of program eligibility requirements can vary-affecting take-up and making it difficult to separate bureaucratic discretion from other aspects of the administrative burden placed on program claimants. However, the nature of formal documentation requirements has been shown to matter. For example, natural experiments have shown that the introduction of requirements for income documentation results in considerable decline in program participation among eligible participants across time (Brien and Swann, 2001 ). Requiring face-to-face interviews and failing to provide applicants with assistance also significantly decrease participation (Wolfe and Scrivner, 2005) . In the case of Food Stamps, requiring less frequent recertification procedures (Klerman and Danielson, 2011) and simplifying the reporting procedures results in more successful claimants (Hanratty, 2006) . On the other hand, fingerprinting of applicants leads to lower rates of Food Stamp application completion (Bartlett, Burstein, and Hamilton, 2004) , and in surveys of non-participants, respondents emphasize their desire to avoid the burdens and intrusiveness of application processes .
Administrative burden can be found across a range of different social welfare programs, but we focus on Medicaid for three reasons. First, the program has substantial variation in administrative rules and eligibility procedures across states, allowing us to examine the factors that shape this variation. Programs like Medicare and Food Stamps, which are largely controlled by the federal government, lack this kind of variation. Second, the program is large and 
Administrative Burden as Policymaking by Other Means
Even within relatively similar policy requirements, public actors often retain a good deal of autonomy in structuring and interpreting administrative details in ways that matter to citizens. This is not simply a matter of discretion about implementing rules; rather, agencies pursuing common policies have distinct formal rule structures that alter citizens' experiences of the state.
"The procedural compliance burdens placed on citizens give rise to some of the most common complaints about the public sector: that it is bureaucratic, slow, unresponsive, and rule oriented.
When rules leave citizens dissatisfied or substantively restrict citizenship rights, these rules have negative impacts-not just for individuals but for governance legitimacy more broadly" (Moynihan and Herd, 2010, 656) .
The primary hypothesis of this paper is that administrative rules in social policy implementation represent an extension of political preferences. As such, variation in these rules would reflect state political context, rather than economic or other factors that could provide less-politicized rationales for expanding or limiting access to Medicaid. One might think that such an idea is already well-documented, but that is not the case. Certainly, empirical evidence shows that politics impacts welfare choices (Hacker 2002) . For example, Klarner, Mao, and Buchanan (2007) demonstrate that the power of business interests explains variation in the generosity of TANF policies across states. Keiser and Soss (1998) find that partisan control of government matters to bureaucratic discretion in terms of granting benefits, but not in terms of how vigorously bureaucrats restrict claims.
Analogous debates take place in other policy areas in ways that reflect partisan preferences. For instance, Republicans generally argue that voter identification laws are necessary to prevent fraud, while Democrats argue that such rules serve mainly as a burden that reduces turnout among eligible voters (Moynihan and Herd, 2010) . As a result, voter identification laws are more likely to be adopted in states where Republicans control policymaking institutions (Hale and McNeal, 2010) . Though such research generally overlooks administrative rules, a few types of rules have garnered attention. For example, Yackee (2006) identifies how business interests influence the federal rulemaking process. But unlike the rulemaking process, which creates formalized structures through which interests can directly influence the process, the politics of state-created administrative rules for welfare programs is less clear.
Theoretical Expectations
Why do some states have complex administrative requirements that seem designed to discourage citizens from accessing benefits, while other states take care to make the process administratively simple? In general, those who lack political power or who are seen as undeserving tend to be less successful in winning benefits from the policy process (Schneider and Ingram, 1997) . Some circumstantial evidence indicates that administrative burden is deliberately used to limit those rights. Brodkin (1987) notes that as far back as the Nixon administration, welfare state programs have not been designed to balance take-up by eligible claimants with mistaken payments to ineligible beneficiaries; instead, administrative procedures have been used to reduce the former in the name of the latter. Historically, federal quality control guidelines offered states much stronger incentives to avoid overpayment rather than to enroll eligible participants (Hanratty, 2006) . Such a tendency remains in contemporary performance evaluations of welfare programs, where reducing fraud is often an important goal, but beneficiary take-up is neglected (Wichowsky and Moynihan, 2008) . In the following section, we describe our data and methodology for documenting variation in states' administrative burdens and for examining their political roots.
Data and Methodology
The key measures of administrative burden came from two primary sources. First, 2010 Medicaid application forms for all 50 states and the District of Columbia were content-analyzed by two graduate students in public affairs using a coding instrument developed by the authors.
This process produced data on the number of questions on each state's form and the requirements for reporting income and expenditures, an approach similar to Slemrod's (2005) method for assessing variation in the complexity of state tax systems. We developed a pilot coding instrument, which revealed that many states did not use a single Medicaid form but instead had multiple versions, indicating that the administrative burden an individual faced depended upon their characteristics. To ensure consistency between the two coders, we asked them to assume a detailed profile of a hypothetical individual applying for Medicaid benefits (a 35-year-old, single white female, previously married, with two children-a relatively common set of characteristics among applicants). Coders were trained about the basic concepts examined in the coding tool, and they raised questions based on issues they encountered during the pilot phase. To ensure intercoder reliability, both coders compared their results after coding the same We considered these to be individual indicators of administrative burden, as well as elements of an underlying latent construct tapping the ease or difficulty involved in claiming Medicaid benefits. Together, these indicators tell us about the overall administrative burden imposed on Medicaid applicants in the state. For example, we assumed that the more information that was required to be provided and documented, the greater the burden on the applicant.
Similarly, the coding mechanism also assumed that vague documentation requirements that provided little detail to claimants on how to satisfy the requests were more burdensome than relatively specific guidelines.
As an example, consider the application package for New York State. Applicants must provide day care costs, documented by a written statement from a day care provider and cancelled checks. Income documentation requires four weeks of consecutive paycheck stubs, a dated and signed letter from an employer documenting employment, and income tax returns.
Child support information requirements include a court-signed letter, documents from the provider of funds, and check stubs. Locating such documentation is a daunting task for anyone, but even more so for individuals with limited resources. If one lacks a bank account, a car, or easy access to a photocopier or the Internet, these tasks become even more challenging. Such requirements are by no means unique to the Empire state.
Requiring applicants to face additional rounds of verification via interviews and repeated regular renewal processes is another step that allows applicants to fail (Wolfe and Scrivner, 2005 The other three variables-racial minorities, political ideology, and party control-tap more politicized factors. We hypothesize that these factors will play a role in structuring administrative burden (as tested in Model 2), even after controlling for the economic factors (as tested in Model 3). [ Figure 1 about here]
To capture an overall measure of states' administrative burdens, we created a composite score by taking the average of the standardized z-scores (M=0, s=1) of each indicator variable.
That value was then restandardized with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. This burden measure is presented in Figure 1 , which maps states based on this value. This measure of administrative burden ranges from more than two standard deviations above the mean in Nevada (3.06) and Nebraska (2.31) to the lowest administrative burdens in Connecticut (-1.28) and Arkansas (-1.35). Table 1 provides a full listing of state values on our overall measure of burden, as well as on each of the indicators.
[ Table 1 and Table 2 about here] Table 2 shows that the composite measure of administrative burden is positively correlated with each of the individual indicators (.45 < r < .76). In addition, additional exploratory analyses (not shown) 6 indicate that administrative burden is associated with actual enrollment in Medicaid-even after controlling for standard measures of need/poverty that we know to drive take-up. Specifically, we found higher rates of take-up among both the general population and among children when state applications had fewer questions, required lower expense reporting burden, and did not require an interview. These tests provide further face validity to our measures of administrative burden. Table 3 presents results from ordinary least squares (OLS) models regressing the composite measure of administrative burden on the six factors specified in Models 1 to 3 presented earlier. Model 1 includes the variables tapping the three less politicized, mostly fiscal considerations that could lead a state to use administrative burden to limit access to its state Medicaid program. Notably, the generosity of states' Medicaid program (captured by their income eligibility level) was not associated with the level of red tape. We also obtained this null finding in bivariate models without additional controls and in the fully-controlled models. In short, we did not find the expected trade-off between expanding eligibility and easing enrollment procedures.
Results: The Politics of Administrative Burden
[ Table 3 about here]
66 To test whether there is a correlation between evidence of red tape and actual enrollment, we conducted two relatively simple sets of regressions (not shown). One was on enrollment of eligible children in Medicaid (the ratio of eligible children enrolled in Medicaid/CHIP to the sum of those children plus uninsured children who were eligible for the programs). Our second set of regressions was on Medicaid enrollment as a percentage of the population. To predict these variables, we regressed each measure of enrollment on a vector of variables capturing poverty/need (percentage of individuals under 18 living under the federal poverty rate, and the percentage of individuals between the ages of 19 and 64 living under the federal poverty rate), as well as each of our individual measures of administrative burden (listed in Table 1 ). This provided us with 10 regressions in total. In our measures of child enrollment, the relationship was significant for the number of questions and the expense reporting burden at p>.05, and for the interview requirement at p>.10. For the more general measure of enrollment, the negative impact of red tape was significant at p>.05 for the expense reporting burden and interviews, and p>.10 for the number of questions. These tests provide further face validity to our measures of administrative burden.
We also found no independent association between administrative burden and state income. We, however, did find a significant association between administrative burden and the amount of assistance the state received from the federal government, measured as the state Model 3 includes all the variables used in Models 1 and 2 to consider their influence over and above one another. The inclusion of the political factors reduced the FMAP coefficient to non-significance (although it remained quite similar in direction and magnitude). However, the inclusion of the economic factors does little to mediate the influence of Democratic Party
Control (with the coefficient reduced only 20 percent to 1.27). Democratic Party Control remains the only significant factor related to administrative burden. This relationship is depicted in Figure   2 , which presents the predicted value of administrative burden estimated from Model 3 in Table   3 . Each bar represents the predicted value under each level of Democratic Party Control (versus Republican Party Control). These estimates assume that divided control is set to zero and all other variables are set at their mean level.
[ Figure 2 about here]
Finally, to examine the robustness of these findings across each indicator of administrative burden, we re-estimated Model 3 from Table 3 for each of the six indicators. To ease comparison across models, we standardized each dependent variable to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. These models are presented in Table 4 . The first four columns present coefficients from OLS regression models, and the final two employ ordered logit models.
The models in Table 4 offer two primary take-aways. was not significant (or even in the expected direction). Instead, all three of the economic (or less political) variables were significant in the model. In short, states were less likely to require these burdensome enrollment procedures when they had more generous eligibility levels (b= -.05, se=.02), greater personal income (b= -.93, se=.46), or higher federal matching rates (b= -.62, se=.25).
[ Table 4 about here]
Conclusion
Jacobs and Soss (2010) offer a recent critique of the field of political science, arguing that it has neglected its own traditions and a powerful explanatory tool by turning its back on political economy arguments that can shed light on policy outcomes. In particular, they call for an examination of how different groups have battled over public policies that have resulted in reinforcing, rather than compensating for, a growing inequality in the distribution of resources in the United States. This paper follows such an approach, offering a preliminary analysis of the political economy of administrative burden in U.S. state Medicaid policies. Administrative burden matters because it directly affects the rate at which eligible claimants access benefits.
Prior research has made clear that administrative burden can negatively affect participation.
One goal of the paper is to simply demonstrate the importance of these types of measures as an appropriate dependent variable in social science. Political scientists already examine policy variation in legislated welfare policies (e.g. Klarner et al., 2007) , but there is less attention paid to the administrative rules that are also a form of policy. Even though policy feedback research suggests that rules can undermine the political efficacy of clients and social policy research shows that such rules have a significant effect on the capacity of eligible claimants to access services, we know relatively little about the source of such rules. In this paper, we identify a series of rules that will plausibly make it more difficult for applicants to claim services, and then we examine whether such rules are associated with political variables.
There are obvious limitations to any cross-sectional analysis with sample size of 51, primarily the risk of endogeneity, the difficulty in asserting causality, and the inability to specify enough variables to develop a complete model. Additional cross-time data would overcome some of these limitations. A qualitative approach would also aid in identifying some of the casual processes we assume here. There are limitations in measurement as well. In this paper, we examine formal aspects of the enrollment compliance burden. Such rules have demonstrated importance to program take-up, but informal practices also make a difference to the burdens that citizens face, and our analysis should not be interpreted to suggest that such rules are implemented uniformly or that bureaucratic discretion does not matter. Administrators, whether employing their discretion or under the direction of political principals, can use informal means to encourage or discourage access to programs. In addition, our measures of political control and ideology, while standard indicators, are broad and will miss some variation between states that we group together.
While the models are inevitably incomplete, there is enough evidence to suggest that which party is in charge matters to the administrative burden. In particular, in states where Democrats exerted strong political control, claimants were less likely to face burdensome enrollment procedures. Although political ideology did not matter, unified Democratic control predicted lower burdens. Our analysis does not allow us to directly observe the causal processes by which Democratic dominance matters, but it seems plausible that it provides a form of political insulation for political and administrative actors from attacks that such programs are too generous or rife with fraud. This finding adds to accounts of red tape as something that occurs largely because rules that may have begun with a useful purpose evolve to become a nuisance without a benefit (Bozeman and Feeney, 2011) . The "rule-evolved" approach is almost certainly present in the formal enrollment burdens we measured-think, for example, of demands for documentation of World War II prison camp reparations. But our findings suggest that red tape does not only arise because of inattention to rules that have outlived their usefulness; there is also a political economy of administrative burden in Medicaid. We see enormous potential for future studies to build upon this finding to further examine why burdens occur in a wide variety of policy contexts. 
